

Auckland Transport – Officials' Comment on JOG Conclusions

Date:	28 October 2003	Priority:	Medium
Security Level:	IN-CONFIDENCE	Report No:	T2003/1824

Action Sought

	Action Sought	Deadline
Minister of Finance	Note key decisions required and risks identified	For Mayoral Forum meeting on 30 October 2003
Minister of Transport	Note key decisions required and risks identified	For Mayoral Forum meeting on 30 October 2003
Associate Minister of Finance (Hon Trevor Mallard)	None	None
Associate Minister of Finance (Hon David Cunliffe)	None	None

Contact for Telephone Discussion (if required)

Name	Position	Telephone	1st Contact
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Enclosure: No

28 October 2003

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Auckland Transport – Officials' Comment on JOG Conclusions

Executive Summary

The Joint Officials Group (JOG) working on Auckland Transport Strategy and Funding is expected to make a final report available to Auckland Mayors and Ministers on 10 November. You are due to attend a meeting of the Auckland Mayoral forum on 30 October to discuss the emerging conclusions from that group. An agreed way forward will be jointly presented by you and Auckland mayors to all Auckland elected representatives in mid December.

An opportunity exists in Auckland to advance a broader range of government policies and initiatives. These include the Growth and Innovation Framework, the Sustainable Development Plan of Action, and the National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy. The strategic level decision making framework for transport is provided by the New Zealand Transport Strategy.

While it seems to be widely acknowledged that traffic congestion in Auckland is having a negative impact on the region's (and the nation's) economy, neither JOG nor officials have been able to quantify this in the time available. In their 1997 study for Auckland local authorities¹, Ernst & Young calculated that the "...Total [annual] cost of congestion for the Auckland region [was] \$755 million". Work undertaken by the Ministry of Transport² has estimated costs slightly below this level. The E&Y study is now cited as the basis for the \$1 billion congestion cost.

While JOG has been able to reach some key conclusions, it is important to note that there are many caveats surrounding the conclusions. This is because these conclusions are in some cases based on assumptions that have not been tested due to both time and data constraints. Further work is likely to be recommended by JOG to test these assumptions. Officials support the need for further work and identify some of that work in this report.

The key findings likely to emerge from the JOG report are:

- The rate at which infrastructure can be constructed is subject to three main constraints: consents, buildability and funding.
- It should be possible to double the amount of annual investment in Auckland transport (for both capital and operating costs), subject to a price premium and maintaining the level of activity in other regions of New Zealand.
- The road pricing modelled delivers significant gains against the NZTS objectives (except for access and mobility) and provides a source of funding for further investment in transport.
- Transport demand management (non-pricing initiatives to optimise the network and change behaviour) can provide early and effective gains against the NZTS.

¹ "Alternative Transport Investments and Economic Development for the Auckland Region", Ernst & Young, May 1997.

² Surface Transport Costs and Charges Study, Ministry of Transport, 2003.

- Increased investment in public transport is essential, and best practice indicates that this needs to be in place before road pricing is operational.
- Accelerated roading does not appear to deliver significant benefits when evaluated at a high level under NZTS objectives. New roads are however likely to be important for community acceptance of road pricing. We note also that increased investment in PT and roading are not mutually exclusive, as buses are likely to be an important component of the public transport network.

Once you have agreed a way forward with Auckland mayors, and broad decisions made on funding levels, officials consider that the decisions about which projects are funded should be left to normal processes, including those set out in the LTMB.

Recommended Action

We recommend that you:

- note** the key findings likely to emerge from the JOG report as described in this report;
- note** the key decisions you may wish to make following your discussions with Auckland mayors;
- note** the key risks around those decisions; and
- refer** this report to Infrastructure Ministers, and to the Minister for Auckland Issues.

Rosemary Cook
Principal Advisor
for Secretary to the Treasury

Roger Toleman
Deputy Secretary
Ministry of Transport

Infrastructure Ministers
Minister of Auckland Issues

Referred: Yes/No

Hon Dr Michael Cullen
Minister of Finance

Hon Paul Swain
Minister of Transport

Auckland Transport – Officials’ Comment on JOG Conclusions

Purpose of Report

1. The Joint Officials Group (JOG) working on Auckland Transport Strategy and Funding is expected to make a final report available to Auckland Mayors and Ministers on 10 November. You are due to attend a meeting of the Auckland Mayoral forum on 30 October to discuss the emerging conclusions from that group.
2. The purpose of this report is to comment at a high level on the JOG emerging conclusions, and on the risks associated with the various issues and/or possible decisions that you may need to discuss with Auckland mayors at that meeting. This report also notes that the JOG work can potentially help to further government initiatives such as Sustainable Cities and the Growth and Innovation Framework, and how it may link with or impact on a number of key transport initiatives such as electronic road user charges (e-RUC) and Surface Transport Costs and Charges. It also outlines how the work aligns with the government’s transport policy framework for transport, the New Zealand Transport Strategy.

Context

3. On 30 May you attended a meeting of the Auckland Mayoral Forum. At that meeting you acknowledged that Auckland had a transport problem to be fixed, and agreed with Auckland mayors to:
 - accelerate transport investment in Auckland;
 - use debt financing as a mechanism to achieve this;
 - urgently investigate revenue mechanisms to support debt;
 - commit to resource and urgently action a joint work programme and financial business plan to advance these issues;
 - form a joint champions group to oversee progress and timeframes; and
 - report back with detailed recommendations by end of August 2003.
4. Cabinet then agreed to the establishment of the Joint Officials group (JOG) and the work streams established under it (POL Min (03)17/8 refers).

New Zealand Transport Strategy and other Government Initiatives

5. An opportunity exists in Auckland to advance a broader range of government policies and initiatives. These include the Growth and Innovation Framework, the Sustainable Development Plan of Action, the National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy, as well as a range of social policy initiatives, such as the disability strategy and the primary health strategy.
6. This suggests that maintaining the impetus on this Auckland transport work is important.

7. Decisions on Auckland transport will however need to be made in the context of the Government's transport policy framework as agreed to by Cabinet (CAB Min (02) 30/4 refers). The New Zealand Transport Strategy ("NZTS") provides a strategic decision-making framework that incorporates broader government initiatives, and thus recognises that transport is only part of the solution needed to achieve a sustainable outcome.
8. Over the next 2 years, government has already identified the need to make a number of key strategic decisions relating to transport. These include whether to make the current road user charging system electronic, and whether the current level of charges applied to various road user groups and between road and rail are achieving the outcomes being sought, and if not then what approach will be adopted to addressing this imbalance. These types of decisions have a direct link to any shorter term decisions made on Auckland.
9. Other regions in NZ are also facing transport issues that potentially affect their social and economic sustainability. They are already looking to this process as a template for resolving their own issues. While it may not be possible, nor desirable, to duplicate this process in other regions, we need to ensure that the work undertaken for Auckland provides the right signals to the rest of New Zealand. Ensuring integration between the range of government initiatives, and applying the NZTS in a practical way, is vital to achieving this.

Next Steps

10. You will meet with Auckland mayors on 30 October. The purpose of that meeting is to share information and exchange views. We understand that Auckland mayors are not expecting that meeting to result in decisions – however over the following two weeks, a 'way forward' will have to be agreed.
11. This agreed way forward will be jointly presented by you and Auckland mayors to all Auckland elected representatives in mid December. Auckland and Wellington representatives of JOG will attend that meeting. For Cabinet to consider what is to be presented in December, agreement will have to be reached with Auckland mayors by November 14. The decision making timeline from then is:

Infrastructure Ministers	18 November
Cabinet Policy Committee	3 December
Cabinet	8 December

12. The JOG report contains a decision making tree, which is at attachment 1, and provides a useful framework for thinking about the decisions that need to be made and the possible funding implications.

The Auckland Problem

13. One of the most important assumptions made by JOG concerns the extent of the Auckland transport problem. While it seems to be widely acknowledged that traffic congestion in Auckland is having a negative impact on the region's (and the nation's) economy, we have not attempted to quantify this. In their 1997 study for Auckland

local authorities³, Ernst & Young calculated that the "...Total [annual] cost of congestion for the Auckland region [was] \$755 million". Work undertaken by the Ministry of Transport⁴ has estimated costs slightly below this level.

14. In 2001 the OECD hosted the European Conference of Ministers of Transport. One interesting conclusion from that meeting was:

"It is unreasonable to expect transport policy alone to be able to reduce traffic growth or to solve, by means of transport, problems caused by decisions taken in other areas. Transport policy therefore needs to be integrated into a broader context."⁵

In other words, action in transport must be made in an environment of an equally strong commitment and action on other initiatives such as land use development, employment productivity, business transformation and action on social well-being. Some of these are consistent with existing government initiatives contained in GIF and Sustainable Development Programme of Action.

15. While the transport/economic growth link is complex, one of the key policies set out in the New Zealand Transport Strategy requires efficiency gains to be made in transport so that economic growth is greater than the rate of transport growth.

16. Any improvement in Auckland's economic performance that may arise as a result of increased investment in transport infrastructure is likely to have a national impact. Broadly, this would be due to the benefits of agglomeration. Agglomeration benefits are derived from improved productivity due to increased scale and specialisation. There may also be benefits gained from the relocation of activity from outside Auckland. These benefits will need to be supported by management of growth in Auckland. In principle, it is possible to estimate the extent of the economic gains to Auckland, netting off the reallocation effects from the rest of New Zealand, to arrive at an overall measure of the extent of national gain. JOG considered commissioning work along these lines. However, it was decided not to proceed because of data and other constraints.

17. We note also, that there could be wider national implications arising from increased investment in Auckland transport. For example the price premium associated with increased levels of activity in the construction industry is likely to be reflected elsewhere.

The JOG Report – Overall View

18. JOG has taken a strategic approach to assessing the transport solutions for Auckland, based on broad transport objectives. This is because the Land Transport Management Bill ("LTMB") sets out a strategic framework for land transport decision making, and thus JOG did not consider it appropriate to make recommendations on particular infrastructure solutions.

³ "Alternative Transport Investments and Economic Development for the Auckland Region", Ernst & Young, May 1997.

⁴ Surface Transport Costs and Charges Study, Ministry of Transport, 2003.

⁵ Conclusions Of Round Table 119:"Transport And Economic Development" **CEMT/CS(2001)37**

19. While JOG has been able to reach some key conclusions, it is important to note that there are many caveats surrounding the conclusions. This is because these conclusions are in some cases based on assumptions that have not been tested due to both time and data constraints. Further work is likely to be recommended by JOG to test these assumptions. Officials support the need for further work and identify some of that work in this report. As a result of there being many caveats surrounding the conclusions, there are risks around some of the decisions you will be expected to make. We identify those risks in this report.
20. Having said that, there are some important decisions that officials consider can be made without prejudicing final outcomes, and overall, officials are relatively comfortable with the conclusions drawn in the JOG report.

The JOG “Package” Approach

21. In order to assist in providing advice to Mayors and Ministers, JOG developed a simplified evaluation framework which was based on the objectives of the NZTS as well as cost effectiveness and implementation risk objectives. To make the assessment more meaningful a number of more detailed factors were developed, both quantitative and qualitative, under each objective.
22. As an initial cut, JOG applied the evaluation framework to Transfund’s current 10 year forecast for roading and public transport investment (Package A) and to the Auckland RLTS (Package B). Neither of these packages performed well against the assessment criteria.
23. As a result of this assessment JOG developed a limited number of illustrative packages for the purpose of testing assumptions, policy choices, and how expenditure in certain categories might deliver particular outcomes:
- Two contained traffic demand management and more public transport - one with a lower level of roading (package C) than the other (Package D).
 - The next two contained further PT investment and introduced road pricing – one with a lower level of roading (Package E) than the other (Package F).
24. While the evaluation framework provided a basis to assess how expenditure in certain categories might deliver particular outcomes, it did not provide a full assessment against the NZTS or the Land Transport Management Bill (LTMB), both of which would require a much finer and more rigorous assessment at project level including an assessment of efficiency and effectiveness at the level of each objective, not at the package level. The JOG assessment must therefore be read with caution – it may under or over state results in some cases.
25. Recent work undertaken by JOG improves our understanding of the social impacts of the packages, although it shows the need for further work in this area. This is also the case for better understanding the link between transport and land use (part of the Sustainable Cities programme) and investment for achieving safety outcomes.

Key Findings

26. The key findings likely to emerge from the JOG report are:

- The rate at which infrastructure can be constructed is subject to three main constraints: consents, buildability and funding.
- It should be possible to double the amount of annual investment in Auckland transport (for both capital and operating costs).
- The road pricing modelled delivers significant gains against the NZTS objectives (except for access and mobility) and provides a source of funding for further investment in transport.
- Transport demand management (non-pricing initiatives to optimise the network and change behaviour) can provide early and effective gains against the NZTS.
- Increased investment in public transport is essential, and best practice indicates that this needs to be in place before road pricing is operational.
- Accelerated roading does not appear to deliver significant benefits when evaluated at a high level under NZTS objectives. New roads are however likely to be important for community acceptance of road pricing. We note also that increased investment in PT and roading are not mutually exclusive, as buses are likely to be an important component of the public transport network.

27. We note that there is a clear relationship between the three constraints. JOG's initial conclusion is that the buildability constraint dominates. Thus, if construction activity can be increased to the levels identified, in most years construction activity is unlikely to be held up by funding or consent constraints.

Buildability Constraints

28. JOG noted that the current level of construction activity in Auckland is around \$200 million p.a. The New Zealand construction industry identified a level of activity, around \$400 million p.a., or approximately twice current levels, which it could achieve over 3 years. Above that, it considers the risks of further activity too high. The risks the construction industry identified include:

- availability of skilled labour;
- higher prices of labour;
- higher prices of raw materials;
- increased safety risk due to inadequate training; and
- disruption to existing networks while construction activity takes place.

29. For the local industry to gear up to that level, however, they would require increased certainty (i.e. consents obtained and funding available) that that level of work would be available. It is estimated that an additional price premium of 20% to 30% may be incurred for construction at \$400 million per annum. This assumes current levels of activity would be retained in other regions i.e. does not allow for additional transport investment in other regions.

30. Officials note that with increased certainty, new players, possibly from overseas may enter the market for some of this work. While this would help alleviate the buildability

constraint, overseas firms are still likely to require significant local labour and therefore would not remove the constraint completely.

Consent Constraints

31. Work is currently underway within central government on Resource Management Act issues. JOG has concluded that constraints from consents are in almost all cases dominated by constraints arising from buildability. No new initiatives have been identified by JOG that would have any impact on timelines or certainty of Resource Management Act outcomes, however, there may be some policy changes that would assist with timelines, including around land purchase policy.

Funding

32. JOG examined several sources for additional funding, either to be used for expenditure on a PAY-GO basis, or for servicing and repaying debt. The sources considered most likely include increased fuel taxes; increased rates; borrowing; road pricing; and Crown contribution. Without road pricing, JOG noted that sufficient revenue could be raised to fund more public transport and TDM (as identified in package C). Officials note that while able to generate revenue, road pricing can also have significant effects on road user behaviour. More importantly it may need to be introduced for reasons other than raising revenue e.g. longer term protection of the roading revenue stream.

33. There are timing issues around the various funding options. For the purposes of the JOG financial model, any revenue from road pricing has not been assumed to be available before 2008.

34. There are specific issues and risks around some of the funding mechanisms and these are set out below.

Fuel taxes

35. JOG looked at increasing national fuel tax and introducing regional fuel tax. JOG's evaluation indicated that:

- fuel excise is relatively inelastic;
- increases in fuel taxes are marginally progressive for most households; but
- increases in fuel taxes potentially involve high excess burden i.e. welfare losses

36. Officials note that regional fuel taxes have been applied in the past and were not effective, even though there were financial penalties if not properly applied. If regional fuel tax were to be used effectively, it will require an intensive compliance regime, including very stringent price controls and financial penalties. This would be needed to avoid the boundary issues that inevitably arise from a regional tax, while at the same time avoiding the problem that the rest of New Zealand might be seen to be paying to solve Auckland's transport problems.

37. If RUC increases were to apply regionally, officials consider there would be serious compliance issues, and thus revenue implications, and could not be managed through the system as it currently stands.

38. Transfund would normally apply the revenue from a national fuel tax increase across New Zealand in accordance with their current project-by-project allocation framework. This may result in Auckland receiving a greater or lesser level of funding than that raised in the region although, based on the current proportion of revenue generated, Auckland would receive up to 35% of funding. If a higher degree of certainty were

sought in the level of funds available for Auckland projects, this could be addressed by using the processes set out in the LTMB, including the use of the performance agreements or establishment of output classes.

39. The remaining funds generated from a national fuel tax increase would also have to be allocated by Transfund. A proportionate regional allocation across New Zealand would mean that the level of spending on transport infrastructure would be able to increase in all regions at the same time. However, if the existing approach to defining outputs were employed, officials consider that this would enable a more effective and outcome focused spend. Further advice would need to be provided if fuel taxes and RUC were raised to help fund Auckland. Irrespective of how the additional funds were allocated around New Zealand, increased activity in other regions could exacerbate the buildability constraints already present in Auckland.
40. Broadly, we consider fuel tax increases to be relatively attractive as a funding mechanism. The Ministry of Transport has evaluated fuel tax trends which suggest that fuel taxes are only sustainable as a revenue source in the short to medium term. If decisions on Auckland were to result in the use of fuel taxes to raise revenue then officials would need to provide further advice on how the desired outcomes could be achieved within the LTMB framework and undertake work necessary to implement the fuel tax increase.
41. We note also that, as identified by JOG, increases in fuel tax will have an impact on the consumer price index. We estimate that a national fuel tax increase of 5 cents per litre would increase CPI by 0.16% increasing the net cost of benefits by about \$16m per annum.

Borrowing

42. Although there are mechanisms available to pay for investment up to the buildability levels without debt, this requires maximising revenue streams, including fuel tax increases. Therefore it may be desirable to use some debt as a buffer. Having some debt in the funding mix, although servicing can prove expensive, allows for smaller increases in fuel taxes and faster build. The level of debt will be limited by the availability of local revenue streams to service it.
43. Debt could be raised at either local or central government level. Local authorities have the ability to raise debt, and already do so for roading. Ideally, the borrower should be an entity with appropriate revenue streams to service debt. On the other hand, there are advantages to debt being raised at central government level: first, central government's credit status means that the debt would be cheaper, and secondly, appropriate control can be exercised over levels of debt.
44. [s9(2)(f)(iv)

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Local Government Revenue

45. JOG has identified that territorial local authorities (TLAs) could raise additional revenue from a variety of sources such as contributions from developers, parking charges, or a general rates increase. JOG has modelled this contribution based on a 5% rates increase for Auckland TLAs. This yields about \$30 m per annum. The ARC has planned rates increases over time to support investment in public transport. While some of the JOG funding pathways show both the ARC and TLA contributions as being required, this is not always the case.

Crown contribution

46. The funding pathways all show a (one-off) capital contribution from the Crown of \$430m. This amount was suggested by the Auckland modellers to fill shortfalls of \$250 in one year and \$180 the next. We indicated to them that it would be inappropriate for us to comment on that number, and therefore have not done so.
47. Some of the JOG funding pathways also show a portion of the existing fuel tax being diverted from the Crown account back into transport. This obviously has wider budgetary implications,.

Road Pricing

48. JOGs assessment shows that road pricing is an important tool to realising many of the outcomes of the NZTS. Investment in Auckland transport can be increased without the use of road pricing. Road pricing may be one of the more viable option for servicing any debt other than general taxation.
49. For the purpose of modelling JOG chose to analyse two types of road pricing – tolling of the existing and new strategic road network, and a cordon toll around the Auckland isthmus. They showed different revenue raising potential and resulted in different effects on transport demand, although both had some significant social impacts, including access to employment opportunities for those living in south and west Auckland. In practice, the extent of these effects is likely to be influenced by a range of interrelated issues, including the type and level of road pricing applied.
50. While JOG chose to model only two types of road pricing, there is a wide range of options, from tolls on strategic roads, tolls on new capacity, cordon tolls, parking charges, up to a full network charge. The choice or mix of road pricing options will be affected by geography, objectives sought, viability of technology, short and long term costs etc.
51. International road pricing experience shows that it is important to be clear about your revenue raising, demand management and/or revenue protection objectives. There will be consequences of an emphasis either way, and it is also important to note that the results are still not always as modelled. For example, the London cordon toll, while having the planned impact on demand, was expected to raise sufficient revenue to fund improvements to public transport, and this has not proven to be the case.
52. If road pricing is to be applied in Auckland then further work is required and it may take in excess of 6 years before an effective system can be introduced. Thus while officials would recommend that the government make a decision in principle to support more road pricing, a great deal more work needs to be done. This work would include:
- identification of the most appropriate road pricing options;
 - resolving technology issues;
 - mitigating social impacts; and
 - addressing other policy issues (such as privacy issues).
53. This work would need to be lead by the Ministry of Transport (to ensure national applicability and consistency with work on electronic road use charges) with the assistance of Transit New Zealand and the Auckland Regional Land Transport Committee.

Public Transport

54. Whether or not government decides to proceed with road pricing, officials would support the JOG recommendation to increase investment in public transport. However, more work needs to be done, in particular to determine the types and levels of public transport investment required over time. As noted above, increased investment in roading is not inconsistent with investment in public transport, as an effective roading system is necessary to an effective public transport network.

Transport Demand Management

55. Transport demand management is about optimising the use of transport networks and about managing demand. The JOG analysis looked at a range of TDM solutions. The modelling and assessment undertaken by JOG indicates that TDM is likely to have a significant impact on achieving a sustainable transport solution for Auckland that is consistent with the NZTS. They note however that the introduction of TDM requires the early introduction of effective public transport particularly in areas where travel choices are most affected. As with public transport, investment in TDM is likely to be long term and strategic, although existing planned investment could readily incorporate TDM measures.

56. As noted by JOG, TDM can impact upon the demand for investment in roading and thus can extend the time needed before roading investment has to be made.

57. Officials support increased TDM, and note that further work will be required by Auckland to develop an integrated and effective mix of TDM measures, including developing expertise to plan and implement a programme of TDM.

Process for Taking JOG Work Forward

58. Transfund is currently developing its new Funding Allocation Framework based on the LTMB and NZTS. The objectives set out in the NZTS were used by JOG to evaluate packages.

59. This suggests that once you have agreed a way forward with Auckland mayors, and broad decisions made on funding levels, the decisions about which projects are funded should be left to normal processes.

60. This will enable other regions in New Zealand to progress their transport issues without the need to establish a similar process to JOG.

Summary of Key Decisions for the Government

61. Following your discussions with Auckland mayors we consider the key decisions you will have to make are:

- To pursue a range of road pricing options;
- To use debt;
- To increase fuel taxes, including RUC, at a national level or at a regional level;
- To make a crown contribution;
- To put the decision making for individual projects into the LTMB process and Transfund, where appropriate;


- To support specific policies and actions by Auckland local government that integrate with and progress the decisions that arise from discussions eg development and implementation of a comprehensive TDM plan.

Summary of the Key Issues and Risks

- a) JOG did not define or quantify the transport problem in Auckland, the extent to which transport investment would affect different sectors, nor the extent to which transport investment in Auckland would generate benefits or otherwise for the rest of New Zealand.
- b) The evaluation criteria developed by JOG were developed prior to the LTMB and the Funding Allocation Framework (FAF) being finalised, and were applied to the Auckland packages, rather than projects, as would be the case under the LTMB. Further, under the LTMB each project will need to be assessed for its efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the NZTS objectives. This may mean that some of the projects Auckland wish to have funded may not be possible through Transfund.
- c) Raising fuel taxes nationally with a regional allocation through the NLTF may lead to sub-optimal decision making in some regions. Using the existing approach to establishing output classes with some more specifically focused on Auckland transport issues may result in a more effective outcome.
- d) Raising fuel tax regionally will require the use of stringent price controls and penalties and, as shown through previous experience, will not be effective. Raising RUC regionally would require the current RUC system to be substantially altered.
- e) Adequate time and resources must be allocated in order to reduce the technology and community acceptance risks around the introduction of road pricing.
- f) Many decisions to be made could have inflationary effects. For example, the price premium associated with an increased level of activity in the construction industry; increased fuel taxes; and the introduction of road pricing could all have inflationary effects.
- g) The JOG modelling assumes some level of rates increases in Auckland. There may be difficulty in gaining community acceptance for this.
- h) Public transport investment needs to be the right sort of investment to deliver the benefits the NZTS seeks (e.g. increased mode share) and needs to take a long term focus.


Consultation

62. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Ministry for Economic Development have been consulted in the preparation of this report.



DECISIONS MADE TODAY WILL SHAPE FUTURE TRANSPORT OUTCOMES

Proposed Decision Tree



Source: JOG workstream analysis