

The Treasury

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[40]	Not in scope	

In preparing this Information Release, the Treasury has considered the public interest considerations in section 9(1) and section 18 of the Official Information Act.

Track 1 Initiative Submission Template

Vote	Vote Justice (with funding implications for Vote Corrections and Vote Police)
Responsible Minister	Hon Amy Adams, Minister of Justice (lead Minister)
Initiative title	Investment Approach to Justice: Burglary Prevention Case
Initiative description	<p>The Justice Sector (New Zealand Police, the Ministry of Justice and the Department of Corrections) is adopting an Investment Approach to Justice by using data and evidence-driven investment decisions to help reduce the burden of crime on society.</p> <p>The actuarial model that supports the Investment Approach has identified burglars under the age of 25 as one of the highest risk groups in the population. Over the next 30 years, this group is predicted to commit 15,300 more burglaries and other offences.</p> <p>In response we have developed a cross-agency initiative that tackles burglary from two angles, addressing both offending, and victimisation.</p> <p>For a burglary to occur requires a motivated offender and suitable target. This initiative focuses on reducing these offenders' motivation to offend by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • providing a Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) programme developed to address the specific factors including anti-social thoughts and beliefs that contribute to offending by burglars • increasing the availability of Correctional reintegration services such as housing and employment support to connect these offenders to pro-social networks and increase their stake in society <p>At the same time, this initiative aims to reduce the availability of suitable targets by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • offering burglary victims who are at risk of repeat victimisation with installation of additional security such as window locks, security lights, or bolt locks. <p>All three of these services have a good evidence base behind them to demonstrate they work to reduce crime, as endorsed by the Justice Sector Chief Science Advisor.</p> <p>This initiative is unique among Social Investment in that it is led by the Ministry of Justice but the funding would go to Police and Corrections. It is genuinely agency-neutral.</p>
Responsible Vote Analyst	[Please provide your name and extension number]

Funding Sought (\$m)	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22 & outyears	TOTAL
Operating	3.463	6.102	9.826	13.552	13.552	46.494
Capital	-	-	-	-	-	-

SUPPORTING INFORMATION AND CONTEXT

Please provide any useful contextual information about the initiative (for example, whether Cabinet has previously considered the initiative or funded a similar initiative through previous Budgets) and list of the supporting information provided to the Vote Analyst in addition to this initiative template (e.g. evaluation and implementation plan).

How does this initiative align with the social investment approach and has this been used and applied with other previous interventions?

Is the initiative significantly different to what was submitted in the November check-point? How has the feedback from the Social Investment Panel been taken into consideration and used in the further development of the initiative?

This initiative fills a gap in current service provision both by Government and community partners of specific responses to the problem of burglary offending and victimisation. Although the Department of Corrections does provide a suite of interventions designed to address and prevent offending behaviours, there is scope to introduce new services to this group of offenders in a way that reflects the risk factors unique to it.

When under Corrections' management, the target group is currently eligible to receive standard rehabilitative options, such as alcohol/drug treatment programmes, and generic "Short Rehabilitation Programmes." However, although programmes are developed to cater for different risk levels and offender types none of these options are specifically geared to addressing the issues and concerns that are unique to serious and/or persistent dishonesty-type offending.

On the Police side of the case there is a unique opportunity for the Government to partner with innovative community partners and the private sector to prevent re-victimisation when burglary has occurred, and deploy new technology to apprehend offenders.

Social Investment Panel Feedback

The Social Investment Panel asked us to further define the cohort, consider the community enrichment opportunities available as part of the initiative, and make it clear why the Government would invest in target hardening for the chosen population.

Taking the feedback of the Social Investment Panel on board, Justice sector officials have met with Tāmaki, the organisation responsible for the first urban transformation project in New Zealand. Tāmaki properties will also be in scope for year one roll out of the target hardening initiative. During detailed design and implementation, New Zealand Police, Tāmaki and key agencies will work in partnership with mana whenua, local service providers and the private sector to ensure opportunities for community enrichment are factored in if we are successful in gaining funding. This is an exciting and innovative initiative which has quick learning loops, scalability, and high returns.

The Ministry of Social Development is actively involved in planning to ensure that support will be provided to eligible clients based on the characteristics and situation of the target population.

Further refinement of our target population has occurred, and this can be seen in the 'expected returns' section of this case through CBA analysis. This initiative is for high and medium risk offenders who commit burglary offences, and victims of burglary as per the attached process flows. In addressing perceived overlap with other bids we wish to address the difference between this initiative and the Corrections Industry, Treatment and Learning (ITL) bid - The Burglary bid is complementary to the ITL bid. Both bids aim to provide additional rehabilitative treatment to prisoners, but differ in terms of the proposed services. The Burglary Prevention bid provides medium and high intensity rehabilitative services specifically to dishonesty offenders, while the ITL bid provides high intensity rehabilitative services to violent and sexual offenders, AOD treatment, educational and reintegrative support. The reintegration component of this bid focuses on offenders finishing community sentences.

VOTE ANALYST OVERVIEW

Please provide a description of how well the initiative aligns with social investment principles (refer to section 1.2 of the guidance for a definition), whether the initiative has significantly changed from the November check-point and an overall view of how well the initiative has reflected feedback from the Social Investment Panel. Does the initiative have all the relevant supporting information?

[Vote Analyst to complete]

1. TYPE OF INTERVENTION

Refer to section 1.3.1 for guidance and explanation on requirements

Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is a core form of psychological treatment. CBT has been well researched and shown to reliably reduce reoffending among many groups of offenders.

CBT is one of the most widely used evidence-based practices for reducing reoffending. Guided by empirical research, CBT focuses on the development of personal coping strategies that target solving current problems and changing unhelpful patterns in cognitions. Offenders are taught to identify their offence patterns including triggers, thoughts, attitudes and beliefs and their current coping methods they are then provided with skills to assist them to develop new pro social coping skills. These include altering their thoughts and changing their behaviour and developing skills in self control and emotional regulation.

In the context of this case, the funding will pay for two types of CBT. First, Corrections will design and implement a new specialist programme for the highest risk burglars. Second, Corrections will adapt its standard programmes (Medium Intensity Rehabilitation Programme and others) to include modules specific to burglary, for community-based offenders.

Reintegration Services play an important role in successfully transitioning offenders from prison back into to the community. There is very promising New Zealand evidence that these services reduce reoffending. Reintegration services provide offenders with practical assistance and support, such as finding employment, accommodation, or navigating through social services.

This initiative will scale up the delivery of reintegration services to include burglars under community-based sentences such as Intensive Supervision.

Target hardening is a term used to describe the process of increasing the security of a property to make it more difficult to burgle, therefore increasing the effort needed by an offender to gain entry to a property. The intended outcome is to deter the offender from burgling a property, and surrounding properties. There will also be a component of crime prevention through promotion and advice as primary prevention. By providing target hardening support to victims – we aim to reduce the likelihood of re-victimisation occurring for people who have been burgled, and their neighbours.

The victim centred prevention of repeat burglary, or target hardening component of this initiative has good evidence of effectiveness across a number of jurisdictions, but is a new initiative in New Zealand. Please refer to the supporting evidence section for further information.

2. CASE FOR CHANGE

Please note: the supporting documentation that has been submitted with the case for change including the process flows are essential reading for the vote analyst assessment.

Target Populations

Offenders:

There are 2,025 20 – 24 year olds who have been proceeded against by Police for a burglary, serious theft or fraud offence in the past year. Over the next 30 years, these 20 – 24 year old serious property offenders are predicted to offend 15,300 times – an average of 8 offences per person, indicating this is one of the highest risk cohorts identified through the Investment Approach to Justice.

- 82% are male; 44% are aged 20 – 21; 57% are Maori
- 3 in every 4 have been managed by Corrections in the past year
- On average the cohort has spent a substantial amount of time under Corrections' management in the community, but has spent less than 2 – 3 months in prison (therefore most access to any form of rehabilitation programme is in the community)

Since the first check-in with the Social Investment panel, it has been identified that a further 1,116 18-19 year old serious property offenders would also benefit from the initiative. These offenders are now being included in the proposal, as their risk of future offending is slightly higher than the 20-24 year-olds.

Victims:

The Investment Approach to Justice model identifies 26,427 individuals who were recent victims of a burglary or other serious acquisitive offence and are predicted to be re-victimised for the same offence type at least once in the future. Half of this group is aged between 20 and 39, while 21% of this group is on a benefit. Please refer to supplementary information provided by the New Zealand Police for further information about locations, and repeat victimisation areas.

Problem Definition / Intervention Logic

Research into the offender cohort has identified the following responsivity barriers and reintegration challenges:

- About half of the serious property offenders have been stood down at school at least twice, or suspended, and the same proportion has received a truancy intervention.
- This cohort makes greater use of mental health services than the comparison group of all 20 – 24 year olds. There's a mix of treatment for substance abuse problems and use of pharmaceuticals for other mental health conditions such as depression and anxiety
- This cohort tends to be concentrated in areas of high deprivation. 64% are living in a decile 8, 9 or 10 neighbourhood as defined by the New Zealand Deprivation Index
- 1 in 5 of the cohort is a known gang member (based on Corrections data)
- This population has a lower income than the broader group of all 20 – 24 year olds, with 3 in 4 of the cohort living in a household with an equalised income of less than \$40,000
- 67% of this cohort are on a benefit

Corrections can deliver Correctional Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and Reintegration Services to high and medium risk groups of offenders under the age of 25 to prevent burglary. Current intervention approaches have been proven to address rehabilitation and reintegration needs with specific groups of high risk offenders and with medium risk offenders however, there have been no specific programmes developed or implemented to address this prolific recidivist cohort of property offenders. Research undertaken as part of the Investment Approach to Justice has identified that if two people have identical demographics and criminal histories, an unemployed offender will have a higher risk of re-offending.

This intervention will take into account the complex responsivity barriers and consider how these may be addressed within a

wider intervention package. Reintegration options should help to equip this cohort with the skills, supports and opportunities to engage in pro-social activities, particularly employment, to provide them with credible alternatives to desist from their offending.

Given that the majority of offenders in this cohort are primarily managed in the community, our interventions will need to be designed to be responsive to the offenders' needs and circumstances on community-based sentences and orders such as Intensive Supervision, Release on Conditions, Home Detention and Supervision. Providing some employability training and support for offenders in this cohort on community-based sentences may also help to reduce further offending, particularly if it assists them in gaining and retaining employment.

The Proposal - Offenders

We will develop an intervention approach aimed at reducing recidivism and victimisation by burglars under the age of 25 by designing rehabilitation programmes aimed at addressing offending by this cohort based on Risk-Needs-Responsivity principles, ensuring that they are applicable in a community-based context as well as in custody.

We will design a package of Reintegration Services to help the target population overcome the responsivity barriers that offenders face. The specifics of the package will be subject to detailed design, but are expected to include employment support, accommodation support and wrap-around reintegration support. As indicated above, it is also intended to focus on providing services to offenders on community-based sentences.

The Proposal – Victims

We have developed an approach designed to prevent repeat victimisation and enhance forensic apprehension capability. This victim-centred strategy ensures that all citizens who are victims of burglary receive advice about how to prevent re-victimisation, and following the logic of social investment, reserves higher cost investment services for high risk victims. For more information and a detailed process flow and implementation plan, please see the attached process map and implementation plan.

[Agency to complete]

CASE FOR CHANGE ASSESSMENT

Please provide comments on how well the initiative and supporting information addresses the following:

- Definition of the problem or opportunity
- Outline of the existing services provided to the identified target population and what need/gap this initiative helps to address. Have other alternative options been considered?
- Description of the target population.
- Explanation of the outcomes expected as a result of the intervention (intervention logic) and robustness of evidence and assumptions underpinning this.

[Vote Analyst to complete]

3. EXPECTED RETURNS

Agencies will need to complete a CBAX assessment for all Track 1 initiatives and fill out the sections below on impact analysis.

Refer to section 1.3.3 for further guidance and explanation on requirements

[Agency to complete]

Impact Analysis

An explanation of who is impacted (winners and losers), what the impacts are (costs and benefits), and when the impacts will be realised and for how long. The impacts should be quantified and monetised if possible.

The primary purpose of this investment is to reduce future offending, and therefore reduce the associated costs of crime to individuals, government and society. These are the only impacts that are quantified and monetised, but based on these impacts alone the initiative is projected to have a positive ROI.

The impact on crime is calculated using two main inputs. The first is the baseline risk prediction that is generated by the actuarial model that supports the Investment Approach to Justice. The second is the estimated reduction off this baseline that is suggested by the international evidence behind the three services in this initiative. Most of the benefits are predicted to be produced within five years by virtue of crime prevented.

The principles of the RNR model state that the risk level of offenders needs to be identified and they should be placed in a programme appropriate for their level of risk. Programmes need to address the criminogenic factors or needs that we know if changed can result in a reduction of reoffending. (These are also known as dynamic risk factors). The research identifies eight criminogenic needs of which four are most important. If these are addressed the highest reduction in reoffending will be achieved. CBT based programmes address the causal pathway by addressing identified criminogenic needs including changes in antisocial cognitive patterns. For Reintegration Services, the causal pathway is through improving connection with pro-social networks and increasing informal social control. These mechanisms relate to a theory of crime known as Social Learning Theory, which has strong empirical support.¹

For target hardening, the causal pathway is through increasing the perceived risks of offending to the offender. This mechanism relates to theories of crime known as Rational Choice Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the theory of Situational Crime Prevention. Empirical tests confirm that increasing the perceived certainty of punishment reduces the likelihood of offending, particularly in relation to property crime.²

Because offending leads to a wide range of other problems for offenders, and because the criminogenic needs targeted for change also cause broader behavioural problems, the initiative could potentially have a wide range of secondary impacts, for example:

- Reduced substance abuse
- Greater employment and reduced welfare receipt
- Reduced housing stress for offenders and their families
- Improved trust and confidence in the Justice system, and reduced fear of crime

These secondary impacts are illustrated in the attached intervention logic. The intervention logic also illustrates that the services lead to a reduction in crime through three main causal mechanisms.

We do not have sufficient evidence to quantify or monetise these impacts, but we will include as many of these impacts as

¹ Pratt, T., Cullen, F., Silers, C., Winfree, T., Madensen, T., Daigle, L., Fearn, N. & Gau, J. (2010). The empirical status of social learning theory: a meta-analysis. *Justice Quarterly*, 27(6).

² Pratt, T., Cullen, F., Blevins, K., Daigle, L. & Madensen, T. (2006). The empirical status of deterrence theory. In F. Cullen, J. Wright & K. Blevins (eds). *Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

possible in the impact evaluation to better understand the full return generated by the initiative.

The impacts on crime are quantified and monetised in the following table. **The ROI is an underestimate** because many of the potential savings are un-quantified, including fiscal savings through reduced need for Police, the Judiciary, legal aid, and reduced costs to the health sector and ACC from crime.

There is no central ROI; the ROI estimates are provided as a range between two scenarios, one with pessimistic assumptions and one with optimistic assumptions. This range is not a confidence interval, but the true return can be expected to be within this range assuming that the services are implemented well, and assuming that their impact reflects the evidence.

Steps have been taken to assure that the initiatives will be implemented well, as evidenced by the supporting documentation including governance arrangements.

Impact Summary Table

Impacts - Identify and list \$m present value, for monetised impacts	Option/scenario		Assumptions and evidence (quantify if possible, and use ranges where appropriate)	Evidence certainty ³
	1 (pessimistic)	2 (optimistic)		

Estimated impact on key outcomes				
Reduction in offending for those provided with Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy	12%	28%	<p>The effect size assumptions are based on the three attached evidence briefs. The evidence briefs summarise the entire extant evidence base. For example, the CBT brief summarises the findings of 26 meta-analyses, each of which in turn incorporates the findings of up to 50 separate robust evaluations.</p> <p>This allows us to clearly observe the distribution in impact that is achieved under more or less successful implementations of the intervention.</p> <p>The approach taken to select appropriate effect size assumptions was to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - look at the spread of effect sizes across different meta-analyses - focus wherever possible on meta-analyses with a similar target population (in this case young offenders) - focus wherever possible on meta-analyses with the most relevant outcome measure (crime, reoffending, etc) - avoid outlier effect sizes - select optimistic scenario as at the third quartile or thereabouts - select pessimistic scenario at the first quartile or thereabouts <p>The optimistic and pessimistic scenarios capture uncertainty around the quality of implementation.</p> <p>The effect sizes reported in the meta-analyses are converted to a percentage reduction in offending using a two-step process. First, the effect size (a cohen's d, correlation coefficient or odds ratio) is converted into a percentage point reduction using the relevant formula in the Cochrane collaboration handbook :</p>	High
Reduction in offending for those provided with Reintegration Services	5%	10%		Medium
Reduction in offending for those households provided with Target Hardening	10%	18%		Medium

³ Rate your level of confidence in the assumptions and evidence as high (green) if based on significant research and evaluations that is applicable, medium (amber) if based on reasonable evidence and data, or low (red) if there is little relevant evidence. Colour the rating box for each impact.

http://handbook.cochrane.org/chapter_12/12_5_4_3_computing_absolute_risk_reduction_or_nnt_from_an_odds.htm

The second step is to convert the percentage point reduction into a percentage reduction by dividing the percentage point reduction by control risk.

The percentage reduction is then applied to the baseline risk produced by the actuarial model in order to provide an estimate of the number of offences prevented through investment. These offence counts are then monetised using estimates of the fiscal and social costs of each crime type.

For CBT the evidence certainty is rated as 'high' to reflect the evidence rating of 'Strong' under the Justice evidence rating scale; see the evidence brief for details.

For Reintegration Services and Target Hardening the evidence certainty is rated as 'medium' to reflect the evidence rating of 'Very Promising' under the Justice evidence rating scale; see the evidence briefs for details.

Other assumptions are that:

There is no decay in effectiveness over time

- this reflects the approach of the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP). WSIPP has analysed decay rates for different outcome measures, and uses a general assumption of no decay for crime. This means that interventions that are successful in reducing crime over a 1-2 year period tend also to be effective at reducing crime over a longer time period.⁴

There will be an equal effect on all offence types (other than for the Target Hardening, where the assumed effect is on burglary only)

- this reflects that the offenders targeted as part of this initiative are predicted to commit multiple types of crime, and CBT/reintegration are designed to prevent all of these offence types

The effect on the number of offences is equal to effect on the offending rate

- this reflects the structure of the actuarial model, with the offence count being a function of the offence rate

Assumption: 2017 and later cohort are identical to 2015 cohort

- the baseline prediction applies to the 2015 cohort, as this is the most recent data available on the IDI. We assume that the 2017 and later cohorts who receive the intervention will be equivalent to the 2015 cohort.

⁴ <http://wsipp.wa.gov/TechnicalDocumentation/WsippBenefitCostTechnicalDocumentation.pdf>

Cost of the Initiative				
Operating costs of the initiative over first 20 years (CBT, reintegration and overhead costs)	\$60.1m	\$60.1m	Costs are presented for the first 20 years to reflect the 50-year analysis, given that the benefits associated with each year's investment are modelled over a 30 year horizon.	High
Operating costs of the initiative over first 20 years (target hardening costs only)	\$49.8m	\$49.8m		High
Government Benefits/(Costs)				
Proactively detected, less serious offences - avoided fiscal cost to district courts and corrections	\$6.5m	\$14.6m	<p>Fiscal savings for each crime type are the lifecycle costs associated with each police proceeding. Detail is provided in a separate excel workbook (Corrections and District Court costs per proceeding.xlsx). Savings relate to unit costs in 2015/16 year and are assumed to be constant over time.</p> <p>The fiscal savings modelled are potential savings. Realising the savings would require explicit decisions to reduce capacity, including both facilities and staff.</p> <p>The fiscal savings are a substantial underestimate as data is not currently available to model any potential savings relating to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Police costs - Judicial costs - Collections, legal aid and public defence - ACC and the health system - Welfare 	High
Acquisitive offences, less serious - avoided fiscal cost to district courts and corrections	\$1.3m	\$2.9m		High
Non-sexual violent offences, less serious – avoided fiscal cost to district courts and corrections	\$0.8m	\$1.9m		High
Acquisitive offences, more serious - avoided fiscal cost to district courts and corrections	Offenders: \$10.3m Victims: \$87.2m	Offenders: \$23.0m Victims: \$157.0m		High
Non-sexual violent offences, more serious – avoided fiscal cost to district courts and corrections	\$7.3m	\$16.4m		High
Proactively detected, more serious offences – avoided fiscal cost to district courts and corrections	\$2.5m	\$5.7m		High
Sexual offences – avoided fiscal cost to district courts and corrections	\$2.6m	\$5.7m		High
Total Quantified Government Impact	\$118m	\$227m		
Wider Societal Benefits/(Costs)				
Proactively detected, less serious offences – avoided social cost	\$24.8m	\$55.3m	<p>Societal benefits are based on the 2006 report from Treasury on the costs of crime. These have been indexed to GDP growth but are assumed to be otherwise unchanged.</p> <p>The Treasury costings have been mapped to the Investment Approach methodology using a weighted average method – see the attached workbook for details (Social costs of crime for Investment Approach.xlsx)</p>	High
Acquisitive offences, less serious – avoided social cost	\$0.9m	\$2.1m		High
Non-sexual violent offences, less serious – avoided social cost	\$3.9m	\$8.8m		High
Acquisitive offences, more serious – avoided social cost	Offenders: \$10.4m Victims:	Offenders: \$23.3m Victims:		High

	\$88.2m	\$159m		
Non-sexual violent offences, more serious – avoided social cost	\$32.6m	\$73.0m		High
Sexual offences – avoided social cost	\$4.0m	\$9.0m		High
Total Quantified Wider Societal Impact	\$165m	\$330m		High
Net Present Value of Total Quantified Societal Impacts	\$283m	\$557m		High

Summary of monetised results		
Use ranges for values where appropriate	Discount Rate	
	6% real (default)	3% real (sensitivity)
Net Present Value (NPV) ⁵	\$173m-\$447m	\$317m-\$759m
Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) ⁶	2.58-5.07	3.2-6.2
Return on Investment (ROI) – Societal Total ⁷	2.58-5.07	3.2-6.2
Return on Investment (ROI) – Government ⁸	1.08-2.07	1.3-2.5

⁵ **Net Present Value (NPV)** - The NPV is the sum of the discounted benefits, less the sum of the discounted costs (relative to the counterfactual). This gives a dollar value representing the marginal impact on the collective living standards of all New Zealanders of the initiative, in today's dollar terms.

⁶ **Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR)** - The BCR is the ratio of total discounted benefits to the total discounted costs. A proposal with a BCR greater than 1.0 has a positive impact, because the benefits exceed the costs. The BCR is the same as the Return on Investment Societal Total, unless there are negative impacts in addition to the fiscal cost of the initiative. All negative impacts are included in the denominator for the BCR measure.

⁷ **Return on Investment (ROI) - Societal Total** - Calculate the ROI by dividing the discounted net change in wider societal impact, including benefits to government, by the discounted cost of the initiative. This can be interpreted as the impact for New Zealanders per dollar the government spends on the initiative, eg, for every \$1 the government spends on this programme, New Zealanders receive benefits of \$3.

⁸ **Return on Investment (ROI) – Government** – Calculate the ROI by dividing the discounted net change in impact for the government by the discounted cost of the initiative. This measures the discounted net marginal (fiscal) benefits to the government.

Supporting Evidence

i.e., the bibliography

For a full description of the evidence behind the initiatives, see the attached evidence briefs. The bibliographies of the evidence briefs are provided here for reference.

Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy

Advisory Group on Conduct Problems (2013). *Effective Programmes for Adolescents by the Advisory Group on Conduct Problems*. Wellington: Ministry of Social Development. <https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/research/conduct-problems-best-practice/effective-programmes-for-adolescents.html>

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Dowden, C. & Andrews, D. (1999b). What works for female offenders: a meta-analytic review. *Crime and Delinquency*, 45.

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Dowden, C. & Andrews, D. (2004). The importance of staff practice in delivering effective correctional treatment: a meta-analytic review of core correctional practice. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 48.

Dowden, C., Antonowicz, D. & Andrews, D. (2003). The effectiveness of relapse prevention with offenders: a meta-analysis. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 47.

Ferguson, L. & Wormith, J. (2013). A meta-analysis of moral recondition therapy. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 57(9).

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4. CONFIDENCE IN EVIDENCE

Each initiative in this bid was chosen after completing a robust evidence review process culminating in an Evidence Brief. Each Evidence Brief is overseen and approved by a research committee chaired by the Justice Sector Chief Science Advisor, Associate Professor Ian Lambie. This ensures that the briefs fairly reflect the evidence.

Each Evidence Brief is designed to advise decision makers on how confident they can be that investment will reduce crime, based on the strength of the evidence. Each Evidence Brief provides an evidence rating based on the same objective criteria. The final rating is built around two separate assessments, one reflecting international evidence, and another – New Zealand evidence.

This approach reflects that effective programmes in one country often, but not always, work in other countries. Therefore, even if international research shows that an investment type can reduce offending, it may not be a strong investment option unless we are able to replicate the results in New Zealand's crime environment.

Both international and New Zealand evidence is assessed using the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods, a 5-point scale with randomised controlled trials at the top (level 5) of the scale. At lower levels, there is an increasing risk that findings are subject to selection bias and a wide range of other challenges to validity. The academics who developed the scale consider Level 3 the minimum in order to conclude the intervention reduces crime¹.

The final rating is measured in a six-grade scale varying from "poor" evidence to "very strong" evidence, as shown in the following table.

Of the three initiatives in this bid, CBT merit a grade of 'Strong' evidence, and Reintegration Services and Repeat Burglary Prevention merit a grade of 'Very Promising' evidence.

		New Zealand studies				
		At least one level 4 or 5 study finds a statistically significant negative impact, no conflicting L4+ studies	Studies show conflicting results, or no impact, or no level 3+ study exists	At least one level 3 study finds a statistically significant positive impact, no conflicting L3+ studies	At least one level 4 study finds a statistically significant positive impact, no conflicting L4+ studies	At least one level 5 study finds a statistically significant positive impact, no conflicting L5 studies
International studies	Meta-analysis/systematic review of 5+ studies finds a statistically significant positive impact, no conflicts	Fair (promising)	Very promising	Strong	Strong	Very strong
	MA/SR with fewer than 5 studies finds positive impact, or no MA/SR exists and level 4 or 5 studies find a positive impact	Speculative	Fair (promising)	Fair (promising)	Very promising	Strong
	MA/SR find conflicting results	Speculative	Speculative	Fair (promising)	Very promising	Strong
	MA/SR shows no impact, or no MA/SR exists	Poor	Speculative	Fair (promising)	Very promising	Strong
	MA/SR shows negative impact, no conflicting results	Poor	Poor	Speculative	Fair (promising)	Strong

There is also a standard interpretation for each evidence rating, as summarised in the following table.

Investment category	Interpretation
Very strong	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very robust international and local evidence that investment tends to reduce crime. • Investment likely to generate a return if implemented well. • Simple monitoring approach should confirm the investment is providing a positive return. • Little additional evaluation required.
Strong	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Robust international and local evidence that investment tends to reduce crime. • Investment likely to generate a return if implemented well. • Could benefit from additional evaluation to confirm investment is delivering a positive return and to support fine-tuning of the investment design.
Very promising	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Robust international or local evidence that investment tends to reduce crime. • Investment may well generate a return if implemented well. • Further evaluation desirable to confirm investment is delivering a positive return and to support fine-tuning of the investment design.
Fair/promising	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some evidence that investment can reduce crime. • Uncertain whether investment will generate return even if implemented well. • May be unproven in New Zealand or be subject to conflicting research. • May benefit from trial approaches with a research and development focus. • Robust evaluation needed to confirm investment is delivering a positive return and to aid in detailed service design.
Speculative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little or conflicting evidence that investment can reduce crime. • Highly uncertain whether investment will generate return even if implemented well. • Primarily suited to trial approaches with a strong research and development focus. • Full rollout should be subject to high-quality evaluation to ensure investment is delivering a positive return, and to deliver insights into detailed service design questions.
Poor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Robust evidence that investment does not reduce crime or that it increases crime. • Should be priority for divestment.

¹ Sherman, L., Farrington, D., Welsh, B., & Mackenzie, D. (Eds). (2002). *Evidence-Based Crime Prevention*. New York: Routledge

VALUE-FOR-MONEY ASSESSMENT

Please provide a comment on how well the initiative and supporting information addresses the following:

- What is the RoI and NPV score and are the assumptions and judgements around expected outcomes reasonable/clearly explained in the impact summary tables
- The Societal RoI is a combination of monetised impacts, un-monetised impacts and the assumptions underlying the impacts. Initiatives will need to demonstrate a societal ROI of at least 2.
- The Government RoI calculates how much one dollar of government spending reduces fiscal cost i.e. the fiscal return on investment. . Initiatives will need to demonstrate a Government ROI of at least 1.

[Vote Analyst to complete]

5. IMPLEMENTATION AND SCALABILITY

This section should detail what changes are required to implement the initiative and the critical success factors to ensure successful implementation in the New Zealand context. It should also consider how decisions around scaling up (or down) will be made and what the key decision points are. **Please attach an implementation/procurement plan as supporting information to this template if available.**

Refer to section 1.3.6 for further guidance and explanation on requirements

This initiative is designed to be scaled up over a period of four years using a process of adaptive implementation. This funding profile will allow us to progressively refine the design of the initiative as the evaluation results from each subsequent year become available. A cross agency governance system will be established to manage this adaptive implementation. Regular reports will provide early indications of where the initiatives are performing more or less well than anticipated, and allow the balance of funding between the programmes, the design of the programmes and the cohort targeting to be continuously adjusted in response.

Offender focussed intervention delivered by Corrections

Programme development will initially focus on preparing a high-risk offender programme manually and then tailoring the content and intensity down to best meet the needs of medium risk offenders. Specialist psychological expertise will support the developmental phases, and internal resource will be leveraged to lead the programme development from design to implementation of the initiatives.

High intensity programmes will be delivered within the Psychological Services either in prison or in the community. Additional resources including additional staffing would be required to deliver Burglary focused interventions.

Corrections already have a number of recruitment and retention strategies to resource more psychologists, including proposals to increase the national psychology workforce. For example, we are currently developing a proposal, in conjunction with the NZ university clinical psychology programmes, to increase the number of clinical psychologists available to work in a Corrections environment. This would involve increasing the number of internships for clinical students as well as senior psychologists to supervise them. This is a longer term proposal but shorter term initiatives to increase the workforce are also being undertaken.

Medium intensity programmes would be delivered in-house by trained programme facilitators and have the ability to be scaled up with additional programme facilitators being sourced to support. Corrections programme facilitators come from a range of backgrounds and are trained and supervised by Corrections to deliver medium intensity rehabilitation programmes. Corrections has sufficient expertise and experience to develop the training required to up-skill our programme facilitators to be able to deliver the intervention, as well as the expertise and experience to provide quality assurance and supervision. Each of the facilitators will need to have completed at least the standard Pathway training and have some experience in the

delivery of Corrections Medium Intensity Rehabilitation Programmes.

Victim focussed Target Hardening delivered by Police

Data capture

Successful implementation critically relies on Police frontline ability to accurately record certain aspects of Modus Operandi (MO). The identification of vulnerable properties that can be offered target hardening relies on the accuracy of this information. Currently the recording of MO in Police's National Intelligence Application (NIA) is variable across districts therefore the initial focus of the implementation will be based around establishing Police processes, capability and capacity for the initiative.

[38]

Capability and Capacity

The initiative requires national coordination and oversight by a National Target Hardening Coordinator. This new role would form part of the already existing Community Services team (currently one Manager and one Coordinator Community Policing) within the National Prevention Centre at Police National Headquarters. Scaling of this initiative will have an impact on resource requirement.

A training module will be designed for the specific frontline and co-ordination roles (e.g. frontline officers will require additional training in coding whereas the training for the coordination roles will likely have more of a focus on building communication and liaison between parties). The training will have a testing period to inform the communication strategy for the initiative.

[33]

IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT

Please provide a comment on how well the initiative and supporting information addresses the following:

- Fit-for-purpose impact evaluation plan with consideration of how the initiative will be evaluated as it is implemented rather than just ex-post.
- Capability and capacity of the agency to deliver the initiative (implementation, project management and procurement). This should also take into consideration the agency's Four Year Plan and previous track record.
- Does the implementation and evaluation plan allow enough flexibility for scalability?

[Vote Analyst to complete]