

# The Treasury

## South Canterbury Finance Limited Information Release

### Release Document

April 2011

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KordaMentha

## **Preliminary Overview of Findings**

**Commercial in Confidence  
Draft Findings Subject to Change**

**18 August 2009**

## Preliminary comments on:

- Group structure.
- Governance.
- Financial position – unaudited 30 June 2009.
- Loan management systems and processes.
- Impairment considerations.
- Financial position and covenant compliance.
- Liquidity.
- Company's restructuring plan:
  - Equity.
  - Assets.
- Forecast liquidity.
- Potential for a call under the Crown Guarantee.




## Restrictions

- Presentation discusses draft findings on work completed to date.
- Further information will be obtained from the companies that may require changes to the views expressed herein.
- Information in this presentation should not be relied on as KordaMentha's final view.
- Information is subject to change and changes will occur before our final reports are issued.
- All information is strictly confidential and should not be disclosed without our express permission in each and every instance.
- All findings are subject to the restrictions that will be contained in our final report.



## Group Structure

- Allan Hubbard is a shareholder or director of some 500 entities.
- We are advised that the most substantial assets now sit either in SCF or Southbury but we do not have visibility into Mr Hubbard's personal assets.



### South Canterbury Finance Board

- Allan Hubbard (as the shareholder) has appointed the directors of SCF:
  - Allan Hubbard (since 1961).
  - Edward Sullivan (1990): partner in Timaru law firm.
  - Bob White (1990): accountant based in Timaru.
  - Stuart Nattrass (2002): also a director of Pike River Coal and Fonterra.
- Directors also own shares in Southbury Group, funded by SCF.
- SCF advises that it intends appointing two truly independent directors, although it seems unlikely that will occur in the near-term outside of an equity raising process.

### Advisory Board


- Established to execute recapitalisation / restructuring.

≡

- Leading negotiations with key stakeholders:
  - Equity investor;
  - Treasury / Government;
  - US Private Placement noteholders;
  - BNZ.



- Previous structure was totally inappropriate for a business of this size:
  - Origination and credit not appropriately structured.
- Organisation recently restructured to reduce cost, establish industry specialisation, and separate loan management and credit processes.







**\$ million**

Cash & Equivalents	148
Tax	48
Other CA	29

Approx. \$80 million at 13 Aug 09

Net Loans	1,651
PP&E	107
Shares & Investments	328
Other	1

**\$ million**

Subs & Assocs		(a)
South Island Farms (69%)		
Dairy Holdings (33%)		
Listed Bonds & Shares	<	
Unlisted Shares		
<b>Total (subject to rounding)</b>	—	

Deposits	(1,576)
Bonds	(350)
USPP (net)	(125)
Other	(27)

**Net Assets / Equity** 234

Coy selling to support liquidity (circa. \$25 million sold since 30 June)



**Subsidiaries & Associates –**

- We have not finalised our review of the carrying value of these assets.

\$ million	
Property	—
Equity in Flexi-Lease (lease receivables)	—
Equity in Subs not Wholly Owned	—
Equity in Hornchurch (Investments)	—
Miscellaneous	—
<b>Total (subject to rounding)</b>	<b>—</b>

**Tax – \$48 million**

- \$9 million deferred tax asset (accounting treatment only).
  - Ability to carry at 30 June being tested.
- \$39 million prepayment into Imputation Credit Account:
  - Company would like to recover but recoverability and timing currently uncertain.




## Loan Review Process

- Consumer loan book reviewed on a portfolio basis.
- ☐ specific loans reviewed for other categories, representing:
  - ☐ by value of the total loan portfolio; and
  - ☐ by number. This metric is distorted by the large number of loan balances below \$500k.
- The review was weighted based on:
  - The risk inherent in a portfolio (e.g. property, rural);
  - The relativity of a specific loan category to the total loan book.
- Our review aimed to understand:
  - General compliance with credit policy;
  - Credit approval processes;
  - Loan management systems and processes;
  - Liquidity of the loan book; and
  - Potential impairment.

# Loan Portfolio



## Loan Portfolio - \$1,689 million (before provisions)





## Loan Portfolio

- Consumer finance book (predominantly personal loans) is comprised of approximately 9,000 borrowers and is generally well managed.
- Plant & Equipment (Face Finance) portfolio is generally originated within credit policy and subsequently well managed.
- Property and Business portfolios are largely illiquid.
- The Property portfolio is significantly impaired.
- Rural portfolio comprises approximately 200 loans, 80% of which are less than \$1 million.

## Loan Origination and Management

- Credit policy is not always complied with, to varying degrees.
- Inappropriate level of analysis of borrowers at origination.
- Lack of covenants and regular monitoring will prevent company from identifying at risk files and taking action to mitigate its position.
- Lack of independent valuation evidence, either at origination or subsequently, is inappropriate.
- No existing risk grading framework, which makes analysis of the loan book (especially for provisioning) extremely difficult.
  - The Company advises that it is in the process of implementing a risk grading framework.



## Loan Origination and Management (cont.)

- Lack of exit strategies when writing loans compromises liquidity. In many cases there are no realistic exit strategies, particularly for business loans.
- Directors and other related parties appear to have been involved in loan management and lending decisions outside the credit chain although we understand this is being addressed.
  - Loans have been managed directly by Allan Hubbard, including the Southbury loan.
  - The Company advises that this process is progressively ceasing.
- It is important to recognise there are some very good loan managers and the portfolio needs to be reallocated accordingly – this process is underway.



## Impairment Considerations

### Current Status

- We have considered management's comments on our specific impairment range.
- We have not yet received the Company's collective provisioning assessment.
- **This overview is preliminary and subject to change.**
  - Collective provisioning remains outstanding.
  - Southbury loan impairment remains outstanding.
  - Auditors' view not yet received.
- Company's additional \$58 million provision announced for 30 June 2009 is comprised of:
  - \$35 million write-off of Waterfront Fund investment.
  - \$23 million additional specific provisions.
- Company's specific loan impairment provisions now total **\$44.5 million.**
- We have also identified at-risk loans, being those which do not currently require a provision but which exhibit characteristics that suggest there may be a risk of future loss.





## Southbury & Directly Related Loans

- We are awaiting updated financial information for Southbury.
- Southbury directly owes SCF \$81 million.
- Further \$22 million owing to SCF by shareholders of Southbury, secured over their Southbury shares (Andy Borland, Lachie McLeod, Stuart Nattrass, Ed Sullivan).
- Southbury now essentially has three assets:
  - Helicopters NZ, which is for sale.
  - Scales Corporation (majority shareholder).
  - SCF, to which we ascribe no value for current purposes.
- We believe Southbury's direct loan (\$81 million) does not need to be impaired but the loans to shareholders may (on the assumption they do not have assets to make-good any loss – we have no information in this regard).
- The Company has advised that it is analysing recoverability / potential impairment of the Southbury shareholder loans.



## Specific Impairment – Preliminary Review

\$ millions	Specific Impairment	
	Total Book	Coy
Business	\$555m	\$5m
Property	\$542m	\$30m
Rural	\$153m	\$3m
Southbury	\$104m	TBC
Plant & Equip	\$260m	\$5m
Consumer	\$76m	\$1m
	<b>\$1689m</b>	<b>\$44m</b>

(a)

- *This impairment is not an IFRS-compliant provision.*
- Company reviewing Southbury potential impairment.
- □ million is our specific impairment recommendation but SCF disagrees.
- SCF advises its auditors are arriving at a provision above \$44 million.
- Expect SCF will adopt a provision above \$44 million but below our analysis.
- Impairment is different to liquidity, which is very poor within the Property and Business books.



### At-Risk Loans

- Loans that exhibit characteristics that indicate potential for future default:
  - Second mortgage assets – high risk of significant loss if first mortgagees take action.
  - Repayment dependent on factors outside the company's control.
  - Indication of declining performance.
  - Concerns about value of security but no objective evidence against which to measure impairment.

(3)



### Collective Provisioning

- Not yet discussed with the Company.
- Needs to take account of:
  - Lack of independent valuation evidence and covenants.
  - At risk files identified through file review.
- Absence of risk grading system makes analysis extremely difficult.
- 3% collective provision on unimpaired / not “at-risk” book equals \$30 million.
- Key variable is the collective provisioning on the “at-risk” portion of the book, as 3% is likely to be too low (but 30% is likely to be far too high).

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**Total Potential Provision**

- Extremely sensitive to collective provisioning.
  - Ranges cannot be finalised until collective provision assessment is complete.
  - Under different scenarios could reach : [3]
  - On our assumptions, the increase above 30 June 2009 provisioning already announced could range between : [3]
- 
- Company is likely to adopt a much lower provision but auditor's position not yet known.



- Net Assets / Equity will be significantly reduced.

(b)

- (b) million in net assets is supported by the following for which our review is not yet complete:

- \$9 million deferred tax asset that will have to be removed from the balance sheet if SCF is not profitable.
- \$39 million prepayment into the ICA that we assume is collectible.
- (b) million as equity in entities owning farming assets (b)
- (b) million in other assets, primarily distressed properties.

## BNZ / CBA Facility

- Default (interest cover) at 30 June 2009.
- Banks extended reporting date to 31 August 2009 to avoid earlier market disclosure.

## US Private Placement

- May have been in breach at 31 Dec 2008 but covenants not being reported.
- Breach of financial covenants at 30 June 2009 to be declared 30 August 2009 gives lenders a right of acceleration (majority vote required).
- S&P downgrade only a breach after 90-days.

## Trust Deed

- Potential for defaults to arise:
  - Liabilities exceed 12x Shareholders Funds if equity falls below \$170 million.
  - USPP is called and not paid within 14 days.
- Company advises Southbury loan was greater than 35% of equity when trust deed signed so it does not have to comply with that Trust Deed covenant.

- Advisory board appreciates the seriousness of the Company's position.
  - The business has \$1 billion of assets that are non-core / illiquid.
  - The level of provisioning may cause issues with BNZ/CBA, the US Private Placement Noteholders and Standard & Poors.
    - Whether issues arise with the Trustee will depend on the level adopted for the audited accounts.
  - The existing shareholders do not have the capacity to rectify the Company's capital problems.
  - Management and Governance has to be further restructured.
  - There are a range of parties who could cause the business to fail in the very short-term.
- Advisory board is finalising a restructuring strategy using:
  - Cameron & Partners for advice and to negotiate with Government.
  - Deloitte for modelling.
- We have yet to sight anything in writing.



### Immediate Steps


- \$150 million Equity Raising:
  - Company advises negotiating with an Australian fund it cannot yet name.
  - Terms Sheet being negotiated – SCF aiming to finalise this week.
  - Injection to be in three \$50 million tranches over 2009 and 2010.
  - Investor to be granted a capital note with a coupon – Tier 1 capital sitting above preference shareholders.
  - Company agrees is inherently conditional on future liquidity issues being addressed (e.g. extension of Government retail deposit guarantee).
  - Conditional on “high-level due diligence”, including receipt of our report.

- US Private Placement renegotiated to avoid repayment:
  - Company seeking government guarantee through wholesale funding guarantee scheme; or
  - New terms to be negotiated, on a more aggressive amortisation schedule and with an immediate partial principal repayment.
- Trust Deed breaches to be remedied through the Equity raising:
  - Trust Deed permits inclusion in Shareholders Funds calculation of “Underwritten” equity if it is unconditionally payable within three months.
  - Adequacy of the amount and the timing of the injection depends on the level of provisioning.
- Governance to be restructured.
  - Investor to appoint directors and have a say in management structures / personnel decisions.
- Standby bank facilities to be necessarily secured.

### Longer-Term Steps


- Systems and processes to be restructured:
  - Company acknowledges inadequacies that have led to illiquid or poorly performing assets.
- Management to be restructured.
- Balance sheet to be restructured:
  - Other Assets to be sold down.
  - Related party loans to be repaid over extended period.
  - Illiquid loans to be sold / assigned.
- Further capital ultimately raised to stabilise Company's balance sheet.
- Key issue will be whether immediate steps are sufficient to provide space for the Company to achieve its plan.

- Company's cash on hand remains around \$80 million.
- Reinvestment rate has been around 40% to 50% since June but has been steadily reducing over recent weeks:



- There is a large increase in maturities leading into the expiry of the Crown Guarantee on 12 October 2010:

SCF Liability Maturity Profile



**NB: graph plots quarterly repayments so guarantee expiry plotted in Nov-10 quarter**



## Liquidity Issues

- Company is working on a financial model to test liquidity and profitability under various scenarios, including the proposed capital restructuring.
- We have reviewed drafts that indicate:
  - Status-quo is not sustainable past early 2010.
  - Sale of “other assets” alone will not support liquidity through 2010.
    - Asset sale strategy will necessarily run into the medium-term.
  - Equity injection will need to be greater than \$150 million to create long-term stability.
- An immediate liquidity crisis will arise if the US PP noteholders call for repayment (NZ\$125 million).
- SCF has placed \$10 million on trust for depositors who have invested since last Monday (10 August 2009). SCF will potentially have to continue placing funds on trust until the Companies Office approves a new prospectus.

- The Company estimates that \$1,841 million owing to 38,096 investors is covered by the guarantee, if it were to default within the guarantee period:

Product (\$ million at 8 July 2009)	No of Investments	No of Individual Investors	Gross Investment
Secured Debenture Stock	45,838	30,908	1,549
Unsecured Deposits	1,178	1,017	30
2010 Bonds			100
2011 Bonds		3,031	125
2012 Bonds		3,140	125
less Investments >\$1m			(52)
less Non-Resident Deposits			(33)
less Related Party Deposits			(3)
<b>Total Potential Crown Gtee Exposure</b>		<b>38,096</b>	<b>1,841</b>

### Our Next Steps to Complete Report – 14 days

- Review liquidity projections and monitor liquidity daily.
- **Week ending 28 August 2009** understand the audited position on:
  - Specific provisioning;
  - Collective provisioning; and
  - Carrying value of Other Assets and Southbury-related loans.
- Receive indicative terms sheet for equity placement.
- Receive report prepared by Cameron & Partners and Advisory Board summarising restructuring proposal, including short-term and long-term objectives.
- Review final financial projections: liquidity; profitability; and, capital structure.
- Final report **28 August 2009**.





## Timing Considerations

- Timing is now critical.
- **28 August 2009** SCF must advise the market of its 30 June 2009 result, which will reveal:
  - Significant loss. Loss will be higher than preliminary announcement.
  - Breach of banking covenants.
  - Breach of US Private Placement covenants.
- SCF believes it will comply with its Trust Deed – we need to understand how.
- Company will also announce it is negotiating with:
  - Investor as part of a fresh capital raising;
  - BNZ in relation to the breaches of its Standby lines; and
  - US PP to secure a waiver / fresh terms.
- **Mid-September 2009** SCF is aiming to have secured fresh capital.



## Key Stakeholders

- A number of parties need to be managed through this process:
  - Regulatory Authorities:
    - MED / Companies Office.
    - Securities Commission.
    - NZX.
  - Treasury.
  - Reserve Bank.
  - Trustee.
  - US Private Placement Noteholders.
- Standard & Poors are less relevant to the outcome, other than potential for negative press around further downgrades.



## The Critical Issue

- SCF accepts that a significant equity injection (proposed \$150 million) and governance and management restructuring are the only solution to any go forward.
- We have yet to see anything in writing or be advised as to identity of the prospective investor.
- Our comments/concerns are:
  - The need for cash injection is immediate and hence it is disappointing this process has been started very late.
  - We have real concerns that \$150 million may not be enough.
  - The loan book has a liquidity lockup and the business lacks projected 2010 profitability. Our report will raise issues rather than being an endorsement for the investment.
- The next predetermined waypoint will be 28 August 2009 when the 30 June 2009 results are released. This will elevate publicity already heightened by the S&P downgrade, and potential for US PP reaction.
- Breaches of the Trust Deed and US PP arrangements may now be unavoidable.
- We understand that the Company's current strategy will be to advise at the time of releasing its accounts that its recapitalisation plan will be advised early/mid September.